The correlated observation of a common object by two users can be used to extract a secret key. This paper sheds light on this approach by the perspective of the bounded observability model.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret-key distribution is an important technology for information security. It is well known that when a sender Alice shares a secret key with a receiver Bob, she can transmit a message to him in such a way that the message remains secret from an eavesdropper Eve. A secret key is information that is not known by any eavesdropper. Secret-key distribution is a method for a sender and a receiver to share a secret key when they share no common secret information in advance.
There are two notions of security: computational security [17] and information-theoretic security [46] . The former guarantees security based on the assumption that there is a limit of Eve's computational power. A well-known example is the public-key cryptography that is widely used on the Internet. A weakness of computational security is that any shared key is exposed to a risk of being decoded in the future by using a future high-performance computer. Information-theoretic security guarantees security even when Eve's computational power is unlimited. Hence, information-theoretic security is stronger than computational security in the sense that the security of a secret key lasts forever once it is shared. Secret-key distribution based on information-theoretic security assumes the acquisition of correlated random sequences from common randomness, which is described by a probabilistic model. It can be rigorously proven that secret keys can be obtained from common randomness using a procedure called secret-key agreement [1] , [31] . In secretkey agreement, Alice and Bob exchange partial information about their random sequences via a public channel and are able to agree on a key that is secret from Eve even though Eve also has the information that is revealed in the public channel.
In this paper, we distinguish the two terms secretkey distribution and secret-key agreement. Secret-key agreement assumes that Alice, Bob, and Eve have correlated random sequences. On the other hand, secret-key distribution includes, in addition to the secret-key agreement, a method for users to acquire correlated random sequences.
In regard to common randomness for secret-key agreement, there are two different types of model: the source model [ Fig. 1(a) ] and the channel model [ Fig. 1(b) ]. In the source model, it is assumed that Alice, Bob, and Eve have respective random sequences that are correlated. In contrast, in the channel model it is assumed that Alice generates a random sequence, she sends it via a noisy channel, and Bob and Eve obtain respective noisy versions of the random sequence. The bounded observability (BO) model proposed by the authors [38] is a source model, and in this paper we focus on this source model for common randomness.
Let us briefly mention other examples of common randomness. Table 1 shows examples of common randomness classified according to the type of model.
Much work has been done on common randomness in wireless systems. In wireless systems, there is inevitable random noise in wireless signals due to fluctuations of the environment. Both source and channel models of common randomness in wireless systems have been investigated. A typical example is the satellite scenario [31] , which we classify as a source model. This scenario assumes that a satellite broadcasts a random signal, each user observes it with her/his own antenna, and there is independent noise in their received signals. Wireless channel models are investigated in [6] and [23] . These models assume that Alice sends a random signal and Bob and Eve observe it with his/ her own antenna, and there is noise in their received signals. In both satellite scenario and wireless channel models, the addition of inevitable noise to the signal before observation prevents Eve from obtaining perfect knowledge of the signals of Alice and Bob.
The source model approach is adopted in the bounded storage model [12] and the limited access model [43] . In the bounded storage model, a huge volume of random bits are broadcast by a trusted entity. Alice, Bob, and Eve independently, privately, and at random select a small subset of the broadcast bits and store these values. It is assumed that the number of each user's random bits is limited because of their limited storage capacity. In the limited access model, a huge number of access points for downloading random bits are prepared by a trusted entity. Alice, Bob, and Eve send download requests to access points, which are selected independently, privately, and at random, but requests are accepted only twice by each access point, so it is impossible for Alice, Bob, and Eve to all download the same random bits.
Another approach to common randomness is based on the principles of quantum physics. Quantum key distribution (QKD) uses correlations resulting from observation of quantum states. Alice and Bob observe a quantum state by choosing her/his measurement base independently, privately, and at random. Observed values of Alice and Bob have high correlation when they choose the same base while they have low correlation when they choose different bases. Alice and Bob can detect Eve's eavesdropping because the correlation between Alice's and Bob's observed values is decreased by eavesdropping. There are two types of QKD based on entangled states [18] and prepared measurement [4] , which are referred to as quantum source and quantum channel, respectively, in Table 1 . In [18] , an entanglement state is prepared and Alice and Bob observe this state. In contrast, in [4] , Alice randomly selects a bit value and a measurement base, and prepares a quantum state depending on the value and the base. Bob obtains a value by observing the state with his measurement base.
An important issue for realizing practical secret-key distribution is how to physically implement common randomness models. The three nonquantum models, the satellite scenario, the bounded storage model, and the limited access model, still lack physical implementations that are based on realistic assumptions. For instance, in the bounded storage model, the assumption that random bits can be broadcast in volumes that exceed available storage capacity is not currently realistic because very large storage is available. Such implementation difficulties in the above three models have been discussed in [10] . Correlated random numbers X; Y; Z of Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively, are generated subject to the joint distribution p XYZ . (b) Channel model. Alice's random number X, which is an input of a channel, is generated subject to the distribution p X . Bob and Eve receive random numbers Y and Z, respectively, which are channel outputs subject to the conditional distribution p YZjX . The joint probability distribution is defined as p XYZ ðx; y; zÞ p YZjX ðy; zjxÞp X ðxÞ. Most research on implementation of secret-key distribution so far has focused on QKD, but QKD still has a crucial drawback: the use of quantum states involves difficult implementation issues that currently limit the key distribution distance. Steady progress is being made to increase the distance [24] , [26] , [30] and a recent state-of-the-art experiment has achieved key distribution over 307-km distance at the key rate of 3.17 b/s [26] . However, it seems to be difficult to drastically improve the key distribution distance.
The difficulties in implementing QKD motivate the study of alternative secret-key distribution schemesVones that do not rely on quantum correlations to achieve common randomness and can be used over larger distances. Moreover, the alternative schemes should be robust in the sense that they are based on physical assumptions that will be realistic for the foreseeable future. This is the motivation for the BO model [38] . The BO model explicitly specifies a set of assumptions for a source model. Within the context of this model, the BO condition describes limits on the information obtained by an observer. There are situations in nature where the complete observation of physical quantities is difficult using current technology because their changes are too fast or too voluminousVthat is, the information required to describe the changes is larger than what we can acquire due to technological limits. A typical example is broadband random light that changes its phase and amplitude quickly [25] , [48] . Exploiting technological limits of observing such phenomena is one way to realize BO and secret-key distribution based on BO [48] . This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we review secret-key agreement from a source model of common randomness. In Section III, we describe secret-key distribution based on BO. Finally, in Section IV, we review an example [25] , [48] of BO and secret-key distribution based on a correlated random source in an optical fiber system.
II. SECRET-KEY AGREEMENT
To transmit a message securely, it is necessary for legitimate users Alice and Bob to share an identical key sequence that is secret from an eavesdropper Eve. Once an identical secret-key sequence is shared, Alice can transmit a message securely to Bob, for example, by using a technique such as a one-time pad [46] .
Let us assume a situation where Alice and Bob, and Eve have access to correlated random numbers, which are correlated in the sense that information about one of the numbers can be obtained by observing another number. 1 The correlated random numbers themselves cannot be used as the secret key because they may not be identical with each other and part of their information may be leaked to Eve through an observation of her own random number. Secret-key agreement [1] , [31] is a technique for obtaining a shared secret key from a sequence of correlated random numbers by communicating via a public channel that may be monitored 2 by Eve.
A. Simple Example of Secret-Key Agreement
Here, we illustrate the secret-key agreement by using an example of playing cards [36] . Let us assume that there are four cards f€K; €Q;~K;~Qg. A trusted dealer shuffles these cards randomly and deals them to Alice, Bob, and Eve, where each player can look at only her/his card. The dealt cards can be interpreted as correlated random numbers because one card has partial information about the others. 3 Then, Alice and Bob execute the following key agreement protocol.
1) Alice and Bob disclose only the suit (€ or~) of their own cards, and Eve can obtain this information. 2) When they disclose the same suit, Alice and Bob can extract a shared 1-bit key as follows: the key is 0 when Alice has Q and Bob has K, and the key is 1 when Alice has K and Bob has Q. 3) When they disclose different suits, Alice and Bob give up extracting a shared key and try again with the next deal. First, let us assume that we are Bob in the situation illustrated in Fig. 2(a) . Bob has~Q, and it is disclosed that Alice also has~. Then, Bob can specify that Alice has~K (Alice can also specify that Bob has~Q). Therefore, they can share the 1-bit key ''1.'' Next, let us assume that we are Eve in the situation illustrated in Fig. 2(b) . Eve knows that Alice and Bob have~but she cannot know who has Q or K. Therefore, the 1-bit key shared by Alice and Bob in the 1 This means that the probability of successfully guessing one of the numbers increases by observing another number. The mathematical definition is introduced in Section II-B. 2 In this paper, we assume that all transmitted messages are authenticated. That is, Eve cannot pretend to be Alice or Bob or manipulate their messages. 3 Without looking at her card, Alice's probability of successfully guessing Bob's card is 1/4. On the other hand, by looking at her card, the probability of success increases to 1/3. situation illustrated as Fig. 2(a) is secret from Eve. Finally, let us assume that we are Bob in the situation illustrated in Fig. 2(c) . In this situation, Alice and Bob should give up sharing a key because Eve may know the contents of all four cards. The above example shows that a key that is secret from Eve can be shared by Alice and Bob by using communication (disclosing of their suit) when correlated random numbers (shuffled cards) are distributed.
B. Mathematical Formulation of Secret-Key Agreement
In this section, we review the formal definitions of a protocol performed by Alice and Bob and the secret-key capacity, which represents the limit of the key generation rate [1] , [31] , [37] . First, we explain some notations used in the context of information theory [14] , [45] . For given random variables V and W, the entropy, the conditional entropy, and the mutual information are denoted by HðVÞ, HðVjWÞ, and IðV; WÞ, respectively. Entropy HðVÞ represents the amount of uncertainty of V before it is observed. Conditional entropy HðVjWÞ represents the amount of uncertainty of V after observing W. 
for all " > 0 and all sufficiently large n, where jKj denotes the cardinality of the set of all possible values of K. Fig. 3 illustrates the secret-key agreement protocol, which is a particular case of a t-step protocol that generates b X K and b Y K 0 . Equation (1) defines the generation rate. Equation (2) means that the random numbers K and K 0 obtained by Alice and Bob, respectively, are the same with probability close to 1. Equation (3) means that the uncertainty HðKjZ n ; C t Þ of K after the observation of Z n and C t is close to the maximum uncertainty 6 of K. It should be noted that (3) implies the two conditions
where the first inequality means that the generated key K is asymptotically uniformly distributed, and the second inequality means that an arbitrarily small amount of information about K leaks to Eve from her random sequence Z n and the disclosed information C t .
Definition 3 [1] , [31] : For a given correlated random source ðX; Y; ZÞ, secret-key capacity SðX; YjZÞ is defined by the supremum of the secret-key rate over all possible secret-key agreement protocols.
As explained in [5] , secret-key agreement can be performed in three steps 7 called advantage distillation, 4 Formally, a protocol is defined based on the Markov conditions of random variables fX n ; Y n ; Z n ; C t ; b X; b Yg as introduced in [1] , [31] , and [37] . In [1] and [31] , condition (3) is replaced by the weaker conditions HðKÞ=n ! R À " and IðK; Z n ; C t Þ=n ", where K is not assumed to be uniformly distributed. It should be noted that the secret-key capacity does not change even if we adopt these weaker conditions. 6 In general, log jKj ! HðKÞ ! HðKjZ n ; C t Þ holds. The left inequality becomes equality if and only if K is uniformly distributed. The right inequality becomes equality if and only if K is independent of ðZ n ; C t Þ, that is, IðK; Z n ; C t Þ ¼ 0. 7 Some of these steps (e.g., advantage distillation and information reconciliation as described in Section III-C) are sometimes realized simultaneously in one protocol. Fig. 3 . Secret-key agreement from correlated random sequences ðX n ; Y n ; Z n Þ. The figure has been adapted from [39] .
information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. We will review these steps in Section II-C-E.
C. Advantage Distillation
Assume that correlation between X and Y is weaker than that between X and Z, and that between Y and Z, that is IðX; YÞ IðX; ZÞ and IðY; XÞ IðY; ZÞ: [20] , [28] , [31] , [36] , [37] , and [41] . We introduce another example in Section III-C.
Here, let us consider the optimal advantage distillation protocol in the sense that the difference Ið b X; b YÞÀ Ið b X; Z; C t Þ is maximized. The advantage distillation capacity is defined in [37] as DðX; YkZÞ sup
where the supremum is taken over all n, t, and protocols ðC t ; b X; b YÞ. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1 [37] : The secret-key capacity is equivalent to the advantage distillation capacity, that is SðX; YkZÞ ¼ DðX; YkZÞ:
From this proposition, we can express the informationtheoretic formula for the secret-key capacity as SðX; YkZÞ ¼ sup
where the supremum is taken over all n, t, and protocols ðC t ; b X; b YÞ. This equality means that the secret-key capacity is equal to the supremum of the difference between the rate of information about b X from b Y and that from ðZ n ; C t Þ. Although no generic advantage distillation technique has been found 10 so far, the proposition may provide a guide to the design of a protocol achieving the secret-key capacity, as mentioned in Section II-F.
D. Information Reconciliation
In this section, we consider a technique called information reconciliation, which allows Alice and Bob to obtain an identical random sequence from the output of ðX; YÞ by using a protocol. Information reconciliation is first introduced in [9] .
Here, we illustrate information reconciliation by using an example of a parity check matrix. Let us consider 5-bit correlated random sequences ðX 5 ; Y 5 Þ, where the difference between X 5 and Y 5 is at most 1 bit. Let A be a matrix defined as 1) Alice sends the information C 1 AX 5 , which is the linear operation over the finite field GFð2Þ, that is, the sum operation ''È'' and the product operation ''Á'' are defined as 0 The joint probability of a particular instance of dealt cards is 1/12. The marginal probability of the Alice's card is 1/4, which is the same as that of the Bob's card. The marginal probability of Eve's two cards is 1/6. Then, we have IðX; YÞ ¼ IðY; XÞ ¼ log 2 4=3 and IðX; ZÞ ¼ IðY; ZÞ ¼ 1 from the definition of the mutual information. X; Z; C 1 ; C 2 Þ ¼ 0. A more general and rigorous proof is given in [36] . 10 It should be noted that it is difficult to obtain an optimal protocol from (6) because the number n, t, and the cardinalities jC 1 j; . . . We can construct an optimal information reconciliation protocol by using a special case of the Slepian-Wolf code [44] , 11 where a source sequence X n is encoded and it is reproduced by the decoder which has access to a side information sequence Y n . Let q be a prime power and assume that X n t ðX 1 ; X 2 ;. . . ; X n Þ is an n-dimensional vector, where each component X i , i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; ng, is an element of GFðqÞ. Fig. 4 illustrates this type of code, where AX n is an nr-dimensional vector and r 2 ½0; 1 is called a coding rate. If Alice has access to Y n , Shannon's source coding theorem [45] asserts that we can construct a code with encoding rate r satisfying r ! HðXjYÞ (7) where the base of logarithm that appears in the definition of HðXjYÞ is q. However, Alice does not have access to Y n in this situation, which is essential for this problem. Surprisingly, from the result of [44] , we can also construct a code with encoding rate r satisfying the same condition (7) .
Here, we consider the use of a linear function for the protocol as follows.
1) Alice and Bob share an nr Â n (sparse) matrix A.
The matrix A may be disclosed to Eve. 2) Alice sends C 1 AX n to Bob via a public channel and let b X n X n , where AX n is the linear operation 12 over GFðqÞ.
which maximizes the conditional probability
The following proposition 13 asserts that there is a good matrix A with rate close to the fundamental limit.
Proposition 2 [16] , [35] : Assume that r > HðXjYÞ:
Then, for all " > 0 and all sufficiently large n, there is an nr Â n (sparse) matrix A such that
It is proved in [35] that the fundamental limit HðXjYÞ is achievable with a type of sparse matrix known as a low density parity check (LDPC) code. When a sparse matrix is used, Bob can replace the above calculation method of b Y n by a practical algorithm such as the sum-product algorithm [27] or linear programming [19] . This fact is important to construct a practical secret-key distribution scheme such as that introduced in Section IV. It should be noted that experimental studies of source coding with decoder side information by using the LDPC code were first provided in [29] and [40] .
It should also be noted that C 1 may be leaked to Eve and the key generation rate should be evaluated considering privacy amplification. This issue will be discussed in Section II-F.
E. Privacy Amplification
In this section, we consider the secret-key agreement in the special case X n ¼ Y n , that is, Alice and Bob have access to the same random sequence X n and Eve has access to Z n , which is correlated with but not identical to X n . This situation will appear in Sections III and IV. The secret-key agreement from this situation is called privacy amplification [5] .
Let us give a simple example of privacy amplification. Assume that Alice and Bob have the same 2-bit random sequence X 2 ðX 1 ; X 2 Þ, where X i is generated with probability
Here, Alice and Bob execute the following protocol, where communication via a public channel is unnecessary.
Alice and Bob extract a 1-bit key as K X 1 È X 2 , where È denotes the sum operation on GFð2Þ. Assume that Eve knows at most one of these two bits, that is, Z ¼ X 1 or Z ¼ X 2 . Then, the probability of successfully 11 An information reconciliation protocol can also be constructed as an error-correcting code, where a disclosed information corresponds to a parity check sequence. It should be noted that this is essentially the same as the source code with side information. 12 In the context of the error-correcting codes, AX n is called the syndrome of X n with respect to the parity check matrix A. Functions A and are designed so that b Y n ¼ X n .
13
It should be noted that X and Y were assumed to be a discrete variable in [16] and [35] . The case of a discrete variable X and a continuous variable Y is considered in [34] . Information reconciliation for continuous sources such as Gaussian sources has been studied in [3] and [8] .
guessing the shared 1-bit key for Eve is 1=2, which implies that she cannot obtain any information about the shared key. In fact, we can easily check that IðK; ZÞ ¼ 0.
An extension of the above idea introduces a linear hash function. Let q be a prime power and assume that X n t ðX 1 ; X 2 ; . . . ; X n Þ is an n-dimensional vector, where each component X i , i 2 f1; 2; . . . ; ng, is an element of GFðqÞ. Then, Alice and Bob execute the following protocol. Let R 2 ½0; 1 be a real number.
1) Alice and Bob share an nR Â n matrix (hash function) B. The matrix B may be disclosed to Eve. 2) Alice and Bob share an nR-bit key as K BX n and K 0 BX n , respectively, where BX n is the linear operation over GFðqÞ. It should be noted that a set of all linear matrices constitutes a universal class of hash functions [13] , where a matrix is selected uniformly at random. We have the following proposition, which is proved by using a universal class of hash functions in [5] , and its extension in [34] .
Proposition 3 [5] , [34] : Assume that ðX; ZÞ is a correlated random source. Assume that a real number R ! 0 satisfies R G HðXjZÞ where the base of logarithm that appears in the definition of HðXjZÞ is q. Then, for any " > 0 and sufficiently large n, there is an nR Â n matrix B satisfying (1)-(3), which implies that R is the key generation rate.
This proposition clearly shows that a key generation rate close to the right-hand side of (10) is achieved by letting R ! HðXjZÞ ¼ IðX; YÞ À IðX; ZÞ, provided X ¼ Y.
F. Combination of Information Reconciliation and Privacy Amplification
In this section, we consider the combination of information reconciliation and privacy amplification, which is first studied in [11] .
We consider the case that the advantage distillation has been done successfully, that is, IðX; YÞ > IðX; ZÞ or IðY; XÞ > IðY; ZÞ. In the following, we assume IðX; YÞ > IðX; ZÞ without loss of generality. It is proved in [11] that, for any information reconciliation protocol, privacy amplification using a universal class of hash functions [13] can be used to approach the secret-key capacity. In the following, we introduce a different approach by using sparse matrices [32] - [34] . We have a following proposition. 14 Proposition 4 [32] - [34] : Assume that Alice and Bob execute information reconciliation: C 1 AX n is sent from Alice, and Alice and Bob calculate b X n and b Y n , respectively, where A is an nr Â n (sparse) matrix. Assume that then they execute privacy amplification:
where B is an nR Â n (sparse) matrix. If a pair ðr; RÞ satisfies r >HðXjYÞ (8)
then for all " > 0 and all sufficiently large n there is a pair ðA; BÞ satisfying (1)-(3).
In the above proposition, we can regard that privacy amplification for a correlated source ðX; ZÞ uses a pair ðA; BÞ, and information reconciliation for a correlated source ðX; YÞ uses A. The key generation rate IðX; YÞ À IðX; ZÞ is achievable by letting r ! HðXjYÞ and R ! HðXjZÞ À HðXjYÞ ¼ IðX; YÞ À IðX; ZÞ. Fig. 5 illustrates the meaning of key generation rate in this case. The key generation rate IðX; YÞÀ IðX; ZÞ is the residual after subtracting IðX; ZÞ and HðXjYÞ from the uncertainty HðXÞ of X, where IðX; ZÞ is the information obtained by observing Z, and HðXjYÞ is the information disclosed for the information reconciliation.
By assuming that communication starts from Bob, that is, C 1 is a constant, we have the fact that SðX; YkZÞ ¼ SðY; XkZÞ from the definition. Then, by using the above discussion, we have SðX; YkZÞ ! maxfIðX; YÞ À IðX; ZÞ; IðY; XÞ À IðY; ZÞ; 0g (10) obtained in [1] , [15] , and [31] . This implies that a secret-key agreement is possible with a positive generation rate when either IðX; YÞ > IðX; ZÞ or IðY; XÞ > IðY; ZÞ is satisfied. Furthermore, from (6), we have the fact that the secret-key capacity is achievable by using an advantage distillation protocol and the above combination of information reconciliation and privacy amplification protocol.
Proposition 4 asserts that IðX; YÞ À IðX; ZÞ is achievable by using a sparse matrix (LDPC code) for the information 14 In [32] and [33] , the weak security conditions HðKÞ=n ! R À " and IðK; Z n ; C t Þ=n " are considered. The strong security condition (3) for a general correlated source is considered in [34] . It should be noted that Z and Y are allowed to be continuous variables in [34] while they were assumed to be discrete variables in [32] and [33] . reconciliation, where Bob can replace the above calculation method of b Y n by a practical algorithm such as the sumproduct algorithm [27] or linear programming [19] . This fact is important to construct a practical secret-key distribution scheme such as that introduced in Section IV.
In the above discussion, we have assumed that Alice and Bob share a pair ðA; BÞ in advance. This means that the desired matrices A and B in Propositions 2-4 may depend on the joint probability distribution of ðX; Y; ZÞ. However, it is shown in [32] and [33] that for given ðr; RÞ, " > 0, and sufficiently large n, there is a pair ðA; BÞ satisfying (1)- (3) for all ðX; Y; ZÞ satisfying (8) and (9) . This fact means that it is unnecessary for Alice and Bob to know the joint probability distribution of ðX; Y; ZÞ and it is sufficient to know HðXjYÞ and HðXjZÞ. Incidentally, instead of sharing a pair ðA; BÞ in advance, Alice can generate ðA; BÞ at random and independently of ðX; Y; ZÞ and send it to Bob via a public channel as introduced in [5] . Since Proposition 4 is shown from the fact that condition (2) is satisfied on average over the random selections of ðA; BÞ, then we can show that these conditions are also satisfied when ðA; BÞ is generated at random. Furthermore, since ðA; BÞ is independent of ðX; Y; ZÞ, we have HðXjZ; A; BÞ ¼ HðXjZÞ, which implies that condition (9) is unaffected by replacing Z by ðZ; A; BÞ. This fact means that the key generation rate IðX; YÞÀIðX; ZÞ is also achievable by disclosing randomly generated ðA; BÞ, where Z n is replaced by ðZ n ; A; BÞ in (3) and ðA; BÞ is considered as a part of C 1 . Finally, we should remark that there is a large amount of literature on advantage distillation, information reconciliation, and privacy amplification. Readers may consult [7] for a survey of this literature.
III. BOUNDED OBSERVABILITY
In this section, we introduce the BO model [38] , which is a particular class of source models based on observation of a common random object.
Let us consider a situation where Alice, Bob, and Eve all have their own set of available measurement methods. A crucial assumption here is that each of the sets of available observation methods is restricted. They select one of their available measurement methods independently, privately, and at random, and observe the common random object using the selected method. The state of the object is assumed to vary randomly in time. A single observation yields a value depending on the state of the object and the selected method. The state of the object is not changed by observations. This set of assumptions is called the BO model.
In the context of the BO model, we further consider the condition that no single available observation can give complete information about the object. This is called the BO condition. In this section, we explain that the BO condition allows secret-key distribution to be possible.
A. Simple Example of Bounded Observability
Here, we introduce an intuitive example to illustrate that the BO condition allows Alice and Bob to share information unknown to Eve. Once this situation is realized, Alice and Bob are ready to obtain a secret-key by using secret-key agreement.
Consider that there are a huge number of particles moving erratically as illustrated in Fig. 6(a) . Because we do not know the initial state (position and velocity) of the particles, their motion may be regarded as a stochastic phenomenon. Now, let us assume that each user is allowed to observe moving particles only via a single small window, that is, a complete view of these particles is not available for anyone, as illustrated in Fig. 6(b) and (c) . Alice, Bob, and Eve choose the position of their windows independently, privately, and at random. Here, let us assume that Alice and Bob accidentally select the same window position [ Fig. 6(b) ] while Eve selects a different position [ Fig. 6(c) ]. Then, in this case, it is impossible for Eve to completely know the common view obtained by Alice and Bob.
B. Mathematical Formulation of Bounded Observability
To formulate the above intuition mathematically, we define the following terminology. Definition 4 [38] : Assume that the state of an object is determined at random subject to a certain probability distribution. Let S be a random variable that takes value in a set S. We call S an object and an element s of S a state.
Definition 5 [38] 
Next, we introduce the following assumptions. A1) Unknown state: A state S 2 S of an object is random and completely unknown before observation. We can obtain information about S only through an observation function. The time series of the states of an object is stationary memoryless. A2) Limited observation: For each observation, each user independently selects a single deterministic observation function, where the selection is restricted to the set M. The observation is performed at the same time. The observation is completed before the secret-key agreement [cf., A4)] and the same observation cannot be performed after the public discussion. This assumption is called ''limited observation'' because it specifies the limits on the method of observation. A3) Passive observation: All users, namely Alice, Bob, and Eve, observe the same state and the state is not changed by observations. A4) Secret-key agreement: After repeating observations n times, Alice, Bob, and Eve obtain random sequences X n , Y n , and Z n , respectively. Then, Alice and Bob can execute a secret-key agreement protocol by using a public authenticated errorfree channel, which may be monitored by Eve. Here, the assumptions A1)-A3) specify a correlated random source, which we call the BO model. The assumptions A1)-A4) together specify a secret-key distribution scheme based on BO. Now, let us note some similarities and differences with other models of common randomness. We assume in A2) that there is only one chance of observing the current state of an object. This is also assumed in the QKD, where the choice of the observation function corresponds to a measurement basis. However, we assume that all observation functions are deterministic and this is not true in QKD. Furthermore, assumption A3) does not hold in QKD. In QKD, the state of a quantum object is changed by observations. This is why eavesdropping can be detected in QKD. In contrast, assumption A3) allows passive eavesdropping in the BO model. In the satellite scenario, noise is an essential part of the model. In contrast, according to assumption A2) all observations are deterministic, and the addition of noise is not an essential part of the BO model. 15 The limited access model does not satisfy the passive observation assumption A3) of the BO model because an access point denies requests after accepting two requests. The bounded storage model satisfies all the assumptions A1)-A3) of the BO model.
In the following, we derive the necessary and sufficient condition for secret-key distribution based on assumptions A1)-A4). Let us first describe an outline of the secret-key distribution scheme, and present details later. First, Alice and Bob share a finite set M AB & M. Then, Alice (respectively, Bob) selects an observation function f A 2 M AB (respectively, f B 2 M AB ) and obtains a value f A ðSÞ (respectively, f B ðSÞ) by observing S with the observation function. On the other hand, Eve selects g 2 M, where the selection is not restricted to M AB and obtains a value gðSÞ by observing the same object S. We assume that Alice, Bob, and Eve all adopt a mixed strategy in the sense of game theory, that is, each player selects an observation function independently, privately, and at random. Let F A ; F B 2 M AB , and G 2 M be random variables corresponding to observation functions selected by Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. It should be noted that Eve may know the probability distributions of F A and F B but cannot know the selected observation functions at the time of observation. The random variable representing the value of S observed with F A , F B , and G is denoted by F A ðSÞ, F B ðSÞ, and GðSÞ, respectively. After the observation, Alice, Bob, and Eve obtain correlated random numbers X ðF A ; F A ðSÞÞ, Y ðF B ; F B ðSÞÞ, and Z ðG; GðSÞÞ, respectively. Because no user can know the object S in advance and no user communicates before observation, we can assume that fS; F A ; F B ; Gg are mutually independent. In the sense of game theory, the payoff is given by SðX; YkZÞ and the secret-key capacity is equal to an equilibrium point
SðF A ; F A ðSÞ; F B ; F B ðSÞkG; GðSÞÞ where inf p E is taken over all probability distributions p E on M corresponding to Eve's observation function G, and sup p A ;p B is taken over all pairs ðp A ; p B Þ of probability distributions on M AB corresponding to a pair of observation functions ðF A ; F B Þ selected by Alice and Bob. It should be noted that the equilibrium point has a positive value if and only if secret-key distribution is possible. Regarding the possibility of secret-key distribution, we have the following theorem proved in [38] .
Theorem 1 [38] : For given S, M, and M AB , the following two conditions are equivalent.
C1) The secret-key distribution is possible for Alice and
Bob, that is, It should be noted that condition C2) means that for any given observation function g 2 M selected by Eve there is an observation function f 2 M AB selected by Alice and Bob such that the value of f ðSÞ is uncertain for Eve after observing gðSÞ. Eve cannot predict the observed value f ðSÞ from the observed value gðSÞ. Condition C2) is called BO in [38] . Theorem 1 implies that under assumptions A1)-A4) this BO condition guarantees that secret-key distribution is possible. Summarizing, assumptions A1)-A3) specify a correlated random source, which we call the BO model. Assumptions A1)-A4) specify a secret-key distribution scheme. BO condition C2) under assumptions A1)-A4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for secret-key distribution in the BO model.
It should be noted that the bounded storage model can be rigorously interpreted as an instance of BO [38] . The BO model is a way of showing why the bounded storage model is secure in a more abstract and general sense. We can imagine that a modified version of C2) could be obtained for the satellite scenario, the limited access model, and the quantum source model used in QKD. However, as mentioned earlier, these models do not satisfy all assumptions A1)-A3) and so C2) cannot be applied strictly to them. QKD does not satisfy A2) and A3), the satellite scenario does not satisfy A2), and the limited access model does not satisfy A3).
C. Secret-Key Distribution Scheme Based on Bounded Observability
In the following, we describe the secret-key distribution scheme and obtain the secret-key distribution rate, assuming that the BO condition is satisfied.
1) Alice and Bob select observation functions F A 2 M AB and F B 2 M AB , respectively, independently, privately, and at random. They both observe S by using their own observation function. Then, Alice and Bob obtain observed values F A ðSÞ and F B ðSÞ, respectively. 2) Once Eve has selected an observation function G 2 M and observed S by using G, Alice and Bob execute the following advantage distillation protocol: 1) Alice and Bob disclose their selection of observation functions F A and F B , respectively, via a public channel, which may be monitored by Eve. 2) Alice and Bob obtain X and Y, respectively, defined as
where the symbol 6 2 V denotes the discarding of an observed value. Since every element of M AB is a deterministic function, we have the fact that X ¼ Y. 3) Finally, after repeating the above procedures 1) and 2) to obtain a correlated random sequence ðX n ; Y n Þ, Alice and Bob execute the privacy amplification protocol 16 described in Section II-E. In step 3) of the above scheme, the information obtained by Eve can be represented by Z ðF A ; 
where HðF A ðSÞjGðSÞÞ > 0 comes from C2).
D. Multiple Observation Attack
In this section, we consider a case where Eve selects two or more observation functions from the same set M AB as Alice and Bob, and guesses the secret key from her observed values obtained by these functions. An observation does not change the state of an object according to the passive observation assumption A3). The passive observation assumption allows Eve to make an attack such that she observes S by using one or more observation functions simultaneously to obtain multiple observed values. This is 16 It should be noted that the information reconciliation protocol is unnecessary here because we assumed in assumption A2) that observations are deterministic. If there are observation noises, we can employ the information reconciliation protocol just before the privacy amplification protocol.
an essential difference from QKD, where the quantum state of an object is changed by an observation and cloning a quantum state is impossible in principle.
In the following, let us assume that an observed value is 1 bit ðHðf ðSÞÞ ¼ 1Þ for any f 2 M AB and Eve selects a subset M E of M AB as well as g 6 2 M AB . Formally, an observation function g 0 : S ! V g Â f0; 1g jM E j of Eve can be defined 17 as g 0 ðsÞ ðgðsÞ; ff ðsÞg f 2M E Þ. To satisfy condition C2) for BO, let us assume that for any f 2 M AB and g 0 there is a constant I E ! 0 such that
Equation (11) means that f ðSÞ can be guessed accurately from g 0 ðSÞ when f 2 M E but the information of f ðSÞ from g 0 ðSÞ is less than 1 bit when f 6 2 M E . Here, let M be a set of functions g 0 satisfying jM E j G jM AB j. 
On the right-hand side of (12), the factor 1=jM AB j corresponds to the probability that Alice and Bob select the same observation function. The factor ð1 À jM E j=jM AB jÞ corresponds to the minimum probability that Eve's selection M E does not include the same observation function as that of Alice and Bob. By assuming that jM E j G jM AB j and I E G 1, the right-hand side of (12) is strictly positive. By applying (10) to the correlated random source ðX; Y; ZÞ we have the fact that secret-key distribution is possible with at least the rate given by the right-hand side of (12).
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF CORRELATED RANDOM SOURCE
This section describes a physical implementation of a correlated random source proposed in [48] . This correlated random source is designed to satisfy the assumptions of the BO model and the condition of BO. Section IV-A and B describe the implementation in an optical system. The security and key generation rate of the implementation method are discussed in Section IV-C and D, respectively. The current status of an experimental demonstration of the method is reviewed in Section IV-E, and we discuss the future outlook of the method in Section IV-F.
A. System Configuration
The configuration of a system for implementing a correlated random source is shown in Fig. 7 . The system uses a random optical signal that corresponds to S and an optical scrambler with a variable parameter that corresponds to the observation function. As mentioned in Section III, the BO model assumes the object S, the set M AB , and the observation function f 2 M AB . In this system, the object S is a common random light, the set M AB is the finite set of the possible parameter values of the observation device (optical scrambler module), and each parameter value of the device is regarded as an observation function f 2 M AB .
We assume that Alice and Bob have the same optical scrambler module, where there is no secret regarding the scrambler module itself, and so Eve may obtain the same type of scrambler module. A common random light S, which 17 We can assume that Eve selects a single observation function g 6 2 M AB without loss of generality. Fig. 7 . System for implementing a correlated random source generating correlated random sequences using common random light generator and optical scramblers. The figure has been adapted from [39] and [48] .
fluctuates unpredictably in phase and/or amplitude, is generated in the common random light generation device and sent to each user via an optical fiber. It is important to note that the light S can be much stronger than the light used in QKD, so it can be described by classical electromagnetic fields, and conventional optical network devices (amplifiers, couplers, detectors, etc.) can be used to implement the system. Alice and Bob select their own parameter values f A and f B independently, privately, and at random and input the common random light S into their own scramblers.
Each scrambler module generates output light depending both on the common random light S and the parameter f A or f B . We assume that the scrambler module has the following properties. 
B. Optical Scrambler Module Using Cascaded Lasers
Here we describe a particular implementation scheme of an optical scrambler module that uses semiconductor lasers [48] . Fig. 8(a) shows an optical scrambler module consisting of N cascadedly coupled semiconductor laser units. Each unit U i has a variable parameter i . The N tuple f ¼ ð 1 ; . . . ; N Þ composes the variable parameter vector of the scrambler module. Fig. 8(b) shows the structure of a laser unit U i . Each unit is composed of a semiconductor laser and an optical self-feedback loop containing a phase modulator, where the parameter i represents the amount of phase shift imposed by the phase modulator and i 2 f0; g. In the scrambler module [ Fig. 8(a) ], S is input to the first unit U 1 , and the laser units are coupled so that the output light of laser unit U i is the input light of laser unit U iþ1 . Because the scrambler module has a cascade structure, its final output L depends on both S and all the phase shift parameters 1 ; . . . ; N when the common random light S is injected. The set of observation functions used by Alice and Bob, as introduced in Section III-B, is M AB ¼ f0; g N in this particular implementation scheme. The cascaded laser system can work as a scrambler module with properties I) and II), because of its synchronization property. To explain this, first, consider a situation where two laser units, each of which has the structure shown in Fig. 8(b) , are injected with a common random light. It has been shown in [2] , [25] , [42] , and [48] that the two laser units can synchronize with each other, i.e., their output light waveforms coincide with each other, if they have the same phase shift parameters, while their outputs are uncorrelated if the parameters are different. Next, let us consider two scrambler modules, each of which consists of a number of cascaded laser units, and suppose that they are injected with the common random light S [ Fig. 8(a) ]. The above property of a laser unit implies that when all the i values of the two scrambler modules match, their final outputs L coincide since the units have the same parameter and input at every stage in the cascade. In contrast, if the i values are matched for i ¼ 1; . . . ; n À 1 but mismatched for i ¼ n between the two scrambler modules, the outputs of the nth units are uncorrelated. The units for i > n have uncorrelated injected lights and so generate uncorrelated outputs, independent of whether their phase parameters are matched. Consequently, the final outputs of the two scrambler modules will be uncorrelated. To summarize, the outputs of two scrambler modules coincide only when they have the same phase shift parameters ð 1 ; . . . ; N Þ while the outputs are uncorrelated when any of their unit parameters are not identical. This property has been experimentally demonstrated for the minimum cascaded system of N ¼ 2 [25] , which we will review in Section IV-E, and it implies that the proposed cascaded laser system satisfies properties I) and II) required of the optical scrambler module.
Note that the cascade structure of the optical scrambler modules is effective for increasing the number of possible observation parameter vectors f ¼ ð 1 ; . . . ; N Þ. The number jM AB j of all possible parameter vectors grows exponentially with respect to N: jM AB j ¼ 2 N . 
C. Security Analysis Based on Bounded Observability Model
Let us discuss the security of the secret-key distribution based on the proposed implementation of the correlated random source by considering the correspondence between the proposed implementation scheme and the BO model. We assume an Eve that executes the multiple observation attack introduced in Section III-D. In this implementation scheme, this type of Eve is described as follows. a) Eve can wiretap the optical fiber to obtain the common random light S. Furthermore, Eve does not change the common random light S that reaches Alice and Bob. b) Eve can split the wiretapped common random light S, and inject S into one or more observation devices, including scrambler modules, to obtain multiple observed values simultaneously. c) Eve can monitor any information exchanged by Alice and Bob via a public channel. However, Eve cannot impersonate Alice or Bob, and Eve cannot alter the information. In other words, the public channel is authenticated. As in Section III-D, M E denotes the set of simultaneous observations selected from M AB by Eve. The cardinality jM E j is equal to the number of scrambler modules that Eve can operate simultaneously in this physical implementation.
To guarantee information-theoretic security, it is sufficient for Alice and Bob to prevent Eve from obtaining perfect knowledge of their generated bits. This situation can be realized by ensuring that the system satisfies the following physical conditions.
i) The common random light S has a fluctuation bandwidth that is too broad to completely observe its fast temporal variation in phase and amplitude with the current technology. Hence, neither the users Alice and Bob nor Eve can observe/record the complete temporal variation of S.
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ii) Alice and Bob make observations for a long time before exchanging parameters, so that Eve cannot have a delay line long enough to store the entire observed signal S for observation after the exchange of parameters. 19 iii) Alice and Bob use the parameter set M AB ¼ f0; g N with N large enough so that jM E j G jM AB j is satisfied. iv) When Eve performs any observation of S that is available to her other than those performed by Alice and Bob (observation via the scrambler module with f A or f B ), Eve's information I E regarding the bit generated either by Alice or Bob is strictly less than unity, I E G 1. Conditions i) and ii) guarantee that Eve cannot reproduce S after Alice and Bob exchange the parameters via a public channel. This implies that it is impossible for Eve to obtain the same bit obtained by Alice and Bob by setting the same parameter and observing S. Condition iii) guarantees that it is impossible for Eve to operate jM AB j scrambler modules with different parameters simultaneously to observe and record all the possible generated bits when S is broadcasted. Condition iv) is equivalent to (11) .
Here, we verify the correspondence of assumptions a)-c) and conditions i)-iv) to assumptions A1)-A4) and condition C2) of the BO model described in Section III. The use of random light for the common injection signal corresponds to the unknown state assumption A1). Conditions i) and ii) guarantee the limited observation assumption A2). Conditions a) and c) for Eve correspond to the passive observation assumption A3) and the secret-key agreement assumption A4), respectively. According to the proof in Section III-D, under assumption b), conditions iii) and iv) guarantee the BO condition C2). Therefore, we can conclude from Theorem 1 that if the system satisfies conditions i)-iv), secret-key distribution is possible.
Next, let us consider the practical feasibility of conditions i)-iv). Condition i) can be satisfied by using broadband random light with bandwidth exceeding the input bandwidth of state-of-the-art sampling devices. Condition ii) can be satisfied by making the observation time before parameter exchange long enough that the length of the required delay line exceeds any practically feasible length of optical fiber. To rigorously satisfy condition iii), Alice and Bob must know the maximum number M of scrambler modules that Eve can operate simultaneously. However, in practice, M can be decided by considering the technological difficulty of splitting S and preparing a huge number of scrambler modules. The exponential dependence of jM AB j on N makes it feasible to achieve jM AB j ¼ 2 N > M ! jM E j to satisfy condition iii). As for condition iv), it is difficult to ensure it in general because there are many possibilities for Eve's observation methods other than using scrambler modules with parameters included in M AB . However, the scrambler module's properties (I) and (II) effectively ensure condition (iv) in the restricted case where Eve's available observation methods are limited to a subset
D. Estimation of Practical Key Generation Rate
A sufficiently large jM AB j must be set depending on the number jM E j of scrambler modules possessed by Eve. From (12) , the key generation rate R decreases as jM AB j increases. This implies that the rate of generating correlated random bits per second should be sufficiently large to obtain a practical key generation rate. 18 Condition i) does not prevent key generation by Alice and Bob. It is unnecessary for them to observe the complete temporal variation of S. It is sufficient for them to measure the outputs of their scrambler modules injected with S by using technologically possible methods and obtain bits via A/D conversion. Such observation by Alice and Bob is much easier than the complete observation of S.
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For example, when Alice and Bob observe bits for 100 s before parameter exchange, Eve has to prepare 2 Â 10 7 km of optical fiber to delay the common random light S, where we assume that the velocity of laser light is 2 Â 10 5 km/s in the optical fiber.
Taking into account the information reconciliation, the key generation rate R can be obtained by using
introduced in [48] , 20 where " is the probability of bits being different even when the parameters are matched and hð"Þ À" log " À ð1 À "Þ logð1 À "Þ is a loss evaluated after the information reconciliation. Experimental results for fast random bit generation using semiconductor lasers are reported in [22] and [47] . From these results, we can expect it to be possible to generate correlated random bits at least at a rate of 1 Gb/s. For example, let us assume that
, and the generation rate of correlated random numbers is 1 Gb/s. From (13), we can conclude that Alice and Bob can generate a secret key with a rate of 1.19 b/s when Eve has jM E j ¼ 2 27 scrambler modules.
E. Experimental Demonstration
Experimental studies have demonstrated the feasibility in principle of the present scheme of information-theoretic secret-key distribution over a distance of 120 km [25] , [48] . The first experiment was performed with the simplest optical scrambler module consisting of a single laser unit ðN ¼ 1Þ [48] . Then, the experimental setup was extended to the minimum cascaded system of N ¼ 2 [25] . In this section, we review the experiment reported in [25] . In the common random light generator, a phase modulator (PM) driven by an electronic noise generator is used to generate the common random light. The common random light is generated by applying random phase modulation via the PM to the coherent output of a laser. The common random light has a center optical wavelength of 1547.281 nm and random phase fluctuation with a bandwidth of 1.5 GHz. The common random light is divided into two beams at a fiber coupler (FC), and each of the beams is transmitted through 60-km-long dispersion-shifted fibers (DSFs). This corresponds to a practical scenario with a maximum distance of 120 km between Alice and Bob. After the transmission, each light power is amplified by an erbium-doped fiber-optical amplifier (EDFA). The polarization direction of each beam is adjusted by a polarization controller (PC) to achieve coherent optical injection. Each beam is attenuated by an optical attenuator (ATT) to adjust the injection strength and then unidirectionally injected into the A-1 (or B-1) laser unit. The output of the A-1 (or B-1) laser unit is injected into the A-2 (or B-2) laser unit during the second stage. 20 In [48] , there is a factor r, which will be explained in Section IV-E. Here, we assume that r ¼ 1. erbium-doped fiber amplifier; FC: fiber coupler; ISO: optical isolator; M: mirror; PC: polarization controller; PD: photodiode; PM: phase modulator; SL: semiconductor laser; and WL filter: wavelength filter. The figure has been adapted from [25] .
In each of the A-1 and B-1 units, the laser is subject to optical feedback from a fiber mirror reflector (M), where the feedback delay time is 35.4 ns. The phase of the optical feedback light is shifted by a binary waveform, generated with an arbitrary waveform generator, with binary values corresponding to phase shift or 0. Note that each unit has an independent phase-shift controller (waveform generator and PM), which can be driven with a parameter sequence of or 0 supplied from outside. The output of A-1 (or B-1) unit is attenuated by an optical attenuator and injected into the A-2 (or B-2) unit. The A-2 and B-2 units are set up similarly to the A-1 and B-1 units, except that the external cavity has a different feedback delay time (56.5 ns). Their optical feedback phases are shifted by or 0 as in the first stage. The outputs of A-2 and B-2 units are detected with a photodiode (PD), amplified with an electric amplifier (Amp), and observed with a digital oscilloscope. Fig. 10 shows examples of temporal intensity waveforms of the scrambler module outputs, i.e., the outputs of A-2 and B-2 units. Note that temporal intensity waveforms of the scrambler module output lights change randomly depending on the common random light. Fig. 10(a) , the feedback phases are set to match at each stage, i.e., between the A-1 and B-1 units, and between the A-2 and B-2 units. Fig. 10(a) shows that the temporal waveforms of the scrambler modules are similar to each other. This implies that synchronization is achieved by the injection of the common random light. In contrast, Fig. 10(b)-(d) shows that synchronization is not achieved when the feedback phases are not set to match.
To measure the similarity between the intensity output waveforms of Alice and Bob's scrambler modules, the cross-correlation coefficient defined as
is used, where I A and I B are the output intensity waveforms of Alice and Bob's scrambler modules, respectively, I A and I B are their mean values, and A and B are their standard deviations. The angle brackets denote time averaging. Fig. 11 shows the effect of the feedback phases on characteristics of synchronization between the two scrambler modules, that is, the cross-correlation plots between the outputs of A-2 and B-2 units for the aforementioned four cases. Synchronization and a high cross correlation of C ¼ 0:888 is achieved only when the feedback phases are matched at every stage, as shown in Fig. 11(a) . In the other cases, no synchronization is achieved. Cross-correlation values of less than 0.2 are obtained when the feedback phases at the first and/or second stages are mismatched. These results confirm that parameter matching of the optical feedback phase at every stage is required for achieving high correlation between the two scrambler modules, and that the required properties I) and II) are satisfied. Fig. 12 shows the short-term cross correlation between the outputs of A-2 and B-2 units when the optical feedback phases are switched in a random sequence of and 0 values. In this experiment, a period of 0.5 s is set for one parameter choice (i.e., the modulation frequency of the phase shift is 2.0 MHz) because the transient time for synchronization must be several hundreds of nanoseconds due to the long external cavity lengths of the laser units. The return to zero (RZ) format is used for the random parameter modulation to reset the temporal waveforms to synchronized states after each parameter choice. Fig. 12 shows the time evolution of randomly selected phase parameter shifts for the four units and the short-term cross correlation between the temporal output intensity Fig. 12 show the feasibility of the realtime successive generation of the correlated bit sequences.
Correlated random bit sequences can be obtained by sampling the output intensity waveforms of scrambler modules and quantizing the sampled values. The key generation rate R can be obtained by using [48] . Here, r ¼ 0:446 is a factor due to a bit extraction technique [25] used to reduce " to " ¼ 0:0145. This technique ignores samples with voltage near the 0/1 threshold because such samples are highly influenced by noise. The key generation rate is estimated as R ¼ 3:24 Â 10 À2 with the values jM AB j ¼ 4, jM E j ¼ 2, and I E ¼ 0:2. This estimation of I E was obtained in [25] by assuming additional possible observations by Eve other than using the observation functions in M AB , i.e., Eve was assumed to use ff g f 2M E and a particular g 6 2 M AB . Under this assumption, a statistical analysis using numerical simulation and experimental data confirmed that Eve's information is less than 0.2, i.e., I E G 0:2. The modulation frequency of the parameter shift is 2 MHz in the experiment. The key generation rate R with this frequency yields a final key generation speed of 2 MHz Â 3.24 Â 10 À2 ¼ 64 kb/s. The final key generation speed can be increased by increasing the phase modulation frequency if the transient time for synchronization is shortened. 
F. Future Outlook
The above experimental results confirm that it is in principle possible to implement a correlated random source that satisfies conditions I), II), and i)-iv), although a particular g 6 2 M AB was assumed to estimate I E . It is also confirmed that the implementation works with ordinary optical fiber and over a long distance of 120 km. However, the experimental system still has points which have to be further improved to make the system practical. First, the bandwidth of S is of a few gigahertz and not broad enough to surely prevent complete observations of it. Second, the number N of stages in the cascade is only N ¼ 2, i.e., jM E j has to be less than 2 2 . This is clearly insufficient to deal with a powerful eavesdropper. It remains as future work to investigate cascaded laser systems with a greater number of stages and driven by common random light with a much broader bandwidth, up to the terahertz range, whose complete observation is impossible in practice.
It is also a future challenge to demonstrate the system working over a longer distance, for example, 1000 km. A potential advantage of the present implementation is that the common random light S can be repeatedly amplified by optical amplifiers to extend the broadcast distance and then the key distribution is possible over a long distance. It is reasonable to expect that the key rate does not rapidly decrease with increasing distance, and this is a good feature quite different from QKD. Experiments in [25] confirmed that no noticeable degradation of the synchronization quality between two scrambler modules is caused by propagation of the common random light S over the 60-km optical fibers with optical amplification, compared with the case of short fibers just a few meters long. This result well supports the expectation that the key distribution is possible over a long distance.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper reviewed the secret-key agreement from a source model of common randomness, a mathematical framework of BO, and an implementation of secret-key distribution based on BO in an optical fiber system.
We can summarize the mathematical framework of the BO model as follows. Assumptions A1)-A3) specify the BO model. BO condition C2) under assumptions A1)-A4) is a necessary and sufficient condition for secret-key distribution in the BO model. The BO condition describes limits on the information obtained by an observer. This formulation allows us to check the possibility of secret-key distribution using the BO condition without specifying a key agreement protocol.
It will be interesting future work to consider cases in which assumptions A1)-A4) are changed. For example, we could consider that observation functions are nondeterministic as assumed in the satellite scenario. We could also consider that passive observation specified in A3) is impossible, as assumed in QKD and the limited access model.
We reviewed a proposed physical implementation of BO in an optical fiber system using conventional optical network devices. This implementation does not provide the eavesdropping detection feature of QKD but it has potential for achieving secret-key distribution over much longer distances.
As regards the proposed implementation, there are some future issues related to the satisfaction of the BO condition. We must investigate cascaded laser systems with a greater number of stages and driven by a common random light with a much broader bandwidth, up to the terahertz range. In addition, it is also important to obtain a more reliable estimation of the upper bound I E considered in iv) of Section IV-C, taking into account the possibility of various eavesdropping attacks. h He is currently working on synchronization of chaotic lasers and its applications for optical secure communications, secure key generation using chaotic lasers for cryptography, fast physical random number generation using chaotic lasers, and synchronization of chaos and consistency in nonlinear dynamical systems.
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